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STATE V. STASSO: OFF-RESERVATION HUNTING
RIGHTS
Monte Beck
INTRODUCTION
The principal problem surrounding Indian hunting, fishing and
trapping rights centers on the relation between the Indian and the
states.' The conflict is between the states' assertion of regulatory
power over the taking of wildlife within its boundaries and the Indi-
ans' claim to immunity from any state power to control the taking
of fish and game governed by treaties with the United States. The
states' claim rests on sovereign police power; the Indians' on consti-
tutional principles. Each has validity. The controversy raised its
head in Montana in State v. Stasso.2
Lasso Stasso, an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Indian Tribes, was convicted in justice court on a
violation of Montana game laws. Stasso shot and killed a deer out
of season at a location outside the boundaries of the Flathead Reser-
vation,3 but "within National Forest Service lands which have never
been patented to any private person. . .. "I Stasso was hunting on
aboriginal tribal lands. Montana adopted the "no regulation" rule
when the Montana supreme court held: (1) the provisions of the Hell
Gate Treaty guaranteed that an enrolled member of the Tribes had
the right to hunt free from Montana game laws on land ceded to the
federal government and which were "open and unclaimed"5 and, (2)
National Forest Service lands were "open and unclaimed" lands.
This decision, resting on the construction of the Hell Gate Treaty,
appears to leave regulation of tribal hunting covered by treaty provi-
sions to the federal government and to the internal control of the
tribes.
This note will focus primarily on the conflict between the
states' assertion of control over off-reservation hunting and the Indi-
ans' claim of immunity from such regulation. It will examine the
origin of the issue and explore possible solutions. Finally, it will
examine Montana's solution as illuminated in Stasso.
1. Burnett, Indian Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Rights: The Record and the
Controversy, 7 IDAHo L. REV. 49, 50 (1970).
2. - Mont. -, 563 P.2d 562 (1977).
3. The actual incident took place in Sanders County, Montana near White Pine Creek.
Stasso was therefore charged and convicted in the justice court, Thompson Falls, Montana.
Additionally, an expert witness testified that the land Stasso killed the deer on was aboriginal
tribal land which the Indians ceded to the federal government.
4. __ Mont. -, 563 P.2d at 563.
5. Id.
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ORIGIN OF THE ISSUE
The onslaught of white settlement in the Northwest forced Con-
gress to impose treaties on various tribes.6 Foremost to tribal leaders
was the assurance that their people would be guaranteed the histori-
cal means of subsistence-hunting, fishing and gathering. At stake
were not only physical necessities but cultural and psychological
ones as well. These activities developed attitudes and skills which
were highly honored in most Indian societies.'
Indians reserved their ancient hunting, fishing and gathering
rights in most of the Northwestern treaties. Typical language ap-
pears in Article III of the Treaty of Hell Gate.' The tribes reserved:
[t]he exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams running
through or bordering said reservation; the right of taking fish at all
usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Ter-
ritory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing; together
with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pas-
turing their horses and cattle upon open and unclaimed land.
Indians contend that the treaties are solemn expressions of the
superior sovereignty and as such, the provisions are immune to state
interference. The Indians' claim to immunity from state interfer-
ence with hunting and fishing provisions rests on the "supremacy
clause:"'
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made . . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges of every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Indians argue, in short, that the Constitution elevates treaties above
state legislation. The states' claim to regulatory power have rested
on (1) the general police power of a sovereign and (2) an abrogation
of treaty rights through state admission acts.
The general police power of a state prima facie includes the
power to regulate its citizens in the taking of all wildlife resources
within the state. In the leading decision of Geer v. Connecticut, ,0 the
Supreme Court held the state has initial authority to regulate the
6. In Choctow Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970), the court stated: "The
Indian Nations did not seek out the United States and agree upon an exchange of lands in
an arm's length transaction. Rather, treaties were imposed upon them and they had no choice
but to consent."
7. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW: A STUDY OF THE PAST AND PRESENT
STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 196 (1971).
8. Treaty of Hell Gate of July 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. 161 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1896).
[Vol. 39
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taking of wildlife. The Court reasoned that since wildlife is the
common property of all citizens and not subject to private owner-
ship, the citizens of the state have power to regulate its exploitation.
Thus the rationale for attempted state regulation of Indian hunting,
fishing and trapping was established.
The 1896 decision of Ward v. Race Horse" is the landmark
decision in favor of treaty abrogation by an act of admission. The
Race Horse case stands for the proposition that treaty hunting
rights may be terminated upon the admission of statehood. Race
Horse, an Indian, was convicted of violating Wyoming game law for
killing seven elk on unoccupied lands in Wyoming. Although an
1869 treaty provided that he should have the right to hunt upon the
unoccupied lands, the fact that Wyoming was admitted on an
"equal footing" with other states superseded and terminated the
treaty right. The state argued that because the Enabling Act did not
expressly reserve hunting rights to Indians, the Act necessarily re-
pealed or abrogated those treaty rights. The Supreme Court upheld
the state's reasoning and concluded that Wyoming, when admitted
into the Union, was "endowed with powers and attributes equal in
scope to those . . .states already admitted."" Therefore, Wyo-
ming's admission gave it the police power of other states, including
the authority to regulate Indians in the taking of wildlife within its
borders. Race Horse's conviction was upheld. Subsequent decisions
in other states expanded the "superseding act doctrine," holding
that admission to statehood annulled treaty rights. 3
Concurrently, however, another body of law was developing
which challenged the superseding act argument. In U.S. v.
Winans," the Supreme Court, without addressing the Race Horse
decision, ruled that treaty rights secured to the Yakimas could not
be extinguished by implication (the usual way that it had been
asserted that acts of statehood superseded treaty rights). Therefore,
enforceable treaty rights may not be abrogated by the states unless
and until Congress expressly delegates the power to do so. 5 In
Winans, the Yakimas contended their 1855 treaty ensured them the
right of taking fish in their "usual and accustomed" places. The
state argued that the admission of Washington into statehood re-
pealed the treaty. The Supreme Court thought otherwise, holding
11. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
12. Id. at 514.
13. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916); State v. Alexis, 89 Wash. 492, 154 P. 810
(1916); State v. Meninock, 252 Mich. 154, 233 N.W. 205 (1930).
14. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
15. See generally Menominee Tribe v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Johnson, The States
versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L.
REv. 207, 208 (1972).
1978]
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that statehood did not extinguish fishing rights retained by the
Indians in the treaty.
The Winans decision had the effect of undermining the Race
Horse doctrine so that it has become almost completely emascu-
lated. The conflict between the Race Horse and Winans rationales
has been generally resolved in favor of the Indians' position and the
Winans rationale.
The Idaho supreme court clearly shattered the superseding act
argument in State v. Arthur.'" The decision established complete
Indian immunity from state hunting regulations when federal treaty
rights are involved. The court held that a member of the Nez Perce
Tribe who shot a deer out of season, on land ceded by an 1855 treaty
was not subject to Idaho state game laws. The court determined
that the reservation of the Indians' right to hunt on open and un-
claimed lands within their aboriginal hunting territory, remains in-
tact regardless of Idaho's admission to statehood. In justifying the
holding, the court focused on the "supremacy clause" and the fact
that the Idaho Enabling Act did not expressly state any intention
to abrogate any of the provisions of the treaty of 1855.7
TREATY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
The prime reason for the Indians' success in maintaining their
treaty rights and in repelling attempted state regulation of off-
reservation hunting land can be attributed to judicial rules of inter-
pretation. There are three basic canons:"8 (1) ambiguous expressions
in treaties must be resolved in favor of the involved Indian parties; 9
(2) treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would
have foreseen and understood them;20 and (3) Indian treaties must
be liberally construed in favor of the Indians.2' These canons applied
in conjunction with the purposes of the treaties2 buttress Indian
interpretations of hunting and fishing treaty provisions. It must be
16. 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953).
17. Id. at 257, 261 P.2d at 141.
18. Wilkinson, A Summary of the Law of American Indian Treaties, MANUAL OF INDIAN
LAW J-8 (1977).
19. McClanahan v. State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
20. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899), quoted in Wilkinson supra note 18.
21. Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
22. In Winters v. US., 207 U.S. 564 (1908), and more recently in Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963), the Supreme Court concluded that Indian treaties should be construed
in light of their purposes. One clearly recognized purpose of the mid-19th century Northwest
treaties was to provide the Indians a continued means of livelihood. Since the reservation
lands were not large enough to support the members of a tribe, the treaties guaranteed the
right to continue taking fish at "all usual and accustomed places . . .; together with the
privilege of hunting. . . upon open and unclaimed land." Art. III of the Treaty of Hell Gate
of 1855.
[Vol. 39
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/9
1978] OFF-RESERVATION HUNTING 327
cautioned, however, that each treaty must be examined to deter-
mine precisely the rights a particular tribe reserved.
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
The necessity for wildlife conservation is the states' policy rea-
son for state regulation of hunting and fishing. If the states do not
regulate the Indians, the fish and game may be wiped out. 3 Sup-
porters of this argument point out that the treaties are "now so
ancient, they can legitimately be ignored." 4 The objection being,
wildlife is not as plentiful as it once was, and that to satisfy the
commercial, recreational, and foodstuff needs of the population,
strict state regulation is a necessity.
The Indians' response is that if Indian hunting and fishing pose
any real threat to the fish and game, then Congress has the author-
ity to regulate its taking.25 The mere passage of time should not
erode solemn treaty rights.26 Moreover, internal tribal regulation
over the time and manner of taking fish and game will ensure the
preservation of the state's wildlife resources. Tribal governments
have passed wildlife conservation ordinances" which prohibit hunt-
ing, fishing or trapping during closed seasons; fix bag limits; and
make unlawful the needless waste of any animal, bird or game after
killing the same.28 The tribal court's power to enforce these ordi-
nances applies to members and extends over areas within reserva-
tion boundaries, usual and accustomed fishing stations, and all
open and unclaimed lands outside the reservation. 2 Indians insist
23. This argument continues to be pursuasive in fishing rights cases such as Puyallup
Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968). In that case the Supreme Court allowed
imposition of Washington's regulatory scheme when "necessary for conservation."
24. Johnson, The States versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Su-
preme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. Rv. 207, 208 n. 4 (1972).
25. A distinguishable but analogous body of law has evolved concerning a state's control
over Indian fishing activities. Puyallup, supra note 23, and more recently US. v. Washington,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), affirms the right of Washing-
ton state to regulate the manner of fishing including the size of the take by Indians, providing
the state can prove it is "necessary for the conservation of the fish"; if it does "not discrimi-
nate against the Indians"; and if the state meets "appropriate standards". Appropriate
standards generally means allocating to the Indians "their fair share," which in this case
meant treaty Indians were entitled to an opportunity to catch 50% "of all the fish which,
absent the fishing activities of other citizens, would pass their traditional fishing grounds."
Id. at 688. In short, the cases are compromises which assure Indians less than complete
immunity from state control.
26. State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 766, 497 P.2d 1386, 1393 (1972). If treaty rights could
be eroded merely because of the passage of time, one could argue for the discarding of the
U.S. Constitution or the Louisiana Purchase.
27. See the Conservation Ordinance of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation, Montana.
28. See MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW, Appendix B, G-19 (1977).
29. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 240 (9th Cir. 1974).
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they have always practiced conservation to protect valuable wild-
life.
THE STASSO CASE
A. What Constitutes "Open and Unclaimed" Lands?
Since treaty hunting provisions are superior to state statutes
enacted under general police power, legitimate Indian hunting areas
are determined by judicial construction of key phrases within treat-
ies. This is the case with the Indians' right to hunt outside the
reservation on "open and unclaimed" lands. In State v. Coffee, the
Idaho supreme court held lands which are privately owned do not
qualify as open and unclaimed." The rationale is that aboriginal
title to private land has been extinguished by private ownership. It
is clear, however, that National Forest Service lands are open and
unclaimed.3' In Arthur the court stated, "It [open and unclaimed
land] was intended to include and embrace such lands as were not
settled and occupied by the whites under possessory rights or patent
or otherwise appropriated to private ownership . ,,"I Arthur in-
volves substantially the same facts as Stasso, including identical
treaty provisions. Hence, the Montana court was pursuaded by the
Idaho court's conclusions 3 and followed Arthur's ruling that the
Indians may hunt on ceded federal lands (National Forest Service
lands) without limitation or restriction.
B. Abrogation by Admission
The Montana supreme court soundly rejected the state's main
argument that the Montana Territorial Act of May 26, 1864 abro-
gated reserved treaty rights.34 The court merely pointed to language
of the Act wherein it was specifically stated the Act shall not impair
existing treaty rights. The Montana court unequivocally rejected
the Race Horse rationale.3 5 Thus, based on sound constitutional
principles (e.g., "supremacy clause"), the Hell Gate Treaty hunting
30. 97 Idaho 905, 914, 556 P.2d 1185, 1194 (1976). Note, however, that in State v.
McClure, 127 Mont. 534, 547, 268 P.2d 629, 635 (1954), it was held that an Indian could hunt
while on non-Indian land but within the reservation.
31. State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho at 261, 261 P.2d at 141 (1953); State v. Stasso, - Mont.
at , 563 P.2d at 565 (1977).
32. Id.
33. State v. Coffee, 97 Idaho 905, 556 P.2d 1185 (1976); State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759,
497 P.2d 1386 (1972); State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953).
34. State v. Stasso, - Mont. at - , 563 P.2d at 564 (1977).
35. Other cases repudiating Race Horse include: State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d
135 (1953); State v. Satiacum, 50 Wash. 2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957); Sohappy v. Smith, 302
F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1968).
[Vol. 39
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provision controlled and did not become subservient to state regula-
tion.
QUESTIONABLE RESULT
Stasso, however, was not decided without apprehension. The
district court judge wrote: "[w]hile the Court disagrees in principle
and seriously questions this result, it must nevertheless adhere to
established legal precedent."3 Although the judge did not say so,
the obvious concern is the loss of state wildlife regulation over mil-
lions of acres of Montana lands governed by federal treaty rights.
Montana's wildlife management program is, no doubt, somewhat
weakened by the Stasso decision. Inaccurate census taking, overuse
of wildlife habitats, and unequal law enforcement represent some
potential problems. In spite of the problems incident to the loss of
state control over the manner in which a tribe may assert its right
to hunt and take game upon open and unclaimed lands, the Stasso
decision is a sound judicial result. The decision is a product of well
established legal principles.
The Idaho supreme court in explaining its position stated in
Arthur:
We are not here concerned with the wisdom of the provisions of the
treaty under present conditions nor with the advisability of impos-
ing upon the Indians certain regulatory obligations in the interest
of conserving wild life; that is for the Federal Government, the
affected tribe, and perhaps the State of Idaho to resolve under
appropriate negotiations; our concern here is only with reference
to protecting the rights of the Indians which they reserved under
the Treaty of 1855 to hunt upon open and unclaimed land without
limitation, restriction or burden. 7
THE SAVING GRAcES
While it appears Montana is restrained from imposing any
state hunting regulations over Indians on open and unclaimed
lands, covered by such a treaty provision as Article III of the Hell
Gate Treaty, there are realistically three potential limitations which
should allay most of the alarm. First, and most important, there is
internal tribal regulation. Secondly, Congress can at any time revise
and update treaty provisions. Finally, the state still could conceiva-
bly intervene. Should any wildlife. species become threatened due
to poor conservation practices in any area, the state could, by anal-
36. Msla. Dist. Ct. Memorandum No. 777, State v. Stasso, - Mont. -, 563 P.2d
562 (1977).
37. State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho at 263, 261 P.2d at 143 (1953).
1978] 329
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ogy, resort to the "necessary for conservation" rationale successfully
used in the Indian fishing rights area and impose hunting regula-
tions on the manner of hunting, 'the size of the take and the like.18
CONCLUSION
Montana courts have applied well-established principles of
constitutional law by not allowing state interference with off-
reservation hunting rights until Congress expressly permits it. The
state and its citizens will likely continue to rail at the notion that
the state has no regulatory powers over Indian hunting. In that
sense, tension will continue to exist, and allegations of reverse dis-
crimination will abound. 9 Tribes can significantly lessen the ten-
sion by showing wise management of wildlife resources. Congress
could ease the tension by examining the wisdom of treaty provisions
made over 100 years ago in light of present conditions.
38. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1974); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S.
681 (1942); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1969); Confederated Tribes of
Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Madison, 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
829 (1963) and U.S. v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd and remanded,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Johnson, supra note 15.
39. GETCHES, ROSENFELT, & WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
177 (1977).
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